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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This article focuses on the interpretations of and changes relating to oil, gas, 
and mineral law in Texas from November 1, 2012, through October 31, 2013. 
The cases examined include decisions of state and federal courts in the State of 
Texas and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.1 
II.  TITLE AND CONVEYANCING ISSUES2 
Key Operating & Equipment, Inc. v. Hegar3 held that a lessee’s implied surface 
easement entitled the lessee to use a road across the surface of the leased tract to 
produce oil from any land pooled with the leased tract, so long as at least part of 
the purpose for using the road was to produce oil from the leased tract.4 The 
 
 ∗ Attorney at Law, Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas (www.bf-law.com). 
 1. This article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil, gas, and 
mineral law decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states are not included. 
Page limitations of this publication required the omission of some cases of interest. The facts in the 
cases are sometimes simplified to focus on the legal principles. 
 2. Other notable cases dealing with title and conveyancing issues include the following: 
Coates Energy Trust v. Frost Nat’l Bank, No. 04-11-00838-CV, 2012 WL 5984693 (Tex. App.—San 
Antonio Nov. 28, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (three part deed construction); Chesapeake 
Exploration, L.L.C. v. BNW Prop. Co., 393 S.W.3d 852 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied) 
(conveyance of executive rights); Dupnik v. Hermis, No. 04-12-00417-CV, 2013 WL 979199 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio Mar. 13, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (conveyance of surface only reserves 
minerals); Key Prod. Co., Inc. v. Quality Operating, Inc., No. 10-10-00379-CV, 2013 WL 1286672 
(Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 28, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (depth limitation in designation of unit 
incorporated into subsequent assignment); Meekins v. Wisnoski, 404 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (sale of minerals subject to probate); Thomason v. Badgett, No. 
02-12-00303-CV, 2013 WL 3488254 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 11, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) 
(deed reservation construed against grantor). 
 3. Key Operating & Equipment, Inc. v. Hegar, 403 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 
Dist.] 2013, pet. granted). 
 4. Id. at 321. 
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Richardson Tract and the Curbo Tract were adjoining tracts.5 Beginning in 
1987, Key Operating leased and produced oil from the Richardson Tract.6 In 
1994, Key Operating acquired a lease on the Curbo Tract and built a road 
across the surface of the Curbo Tract to access oil wells on both tracts.7 In 2000, 
the last well on the Curbo Tract stopped producing, and Key Operating 
acquired a new lease with a pooling clause on an undivided 1/16 of the minerals 
in the Curbo Tract.8 Pursuant to the new lease, Key Operating pooled the 
Richardson and Curbo Tracts into the forty-acre Richardson–Curbo Unit.9 The 
Unit included thirty acres from the Richardson Tract and ten acres out of the 
eighty-five acres in the Curbo Tract.10 All production was from wells located on 
the Richardson Tract, which Key Operating accessed using the road across the 
Curbo Tract. In 2002, the Hegars purchased an unsevered 1/4 mineral interest 
and the surface of the Curbo Tract and built a house very close to the road.11 
Subsequently, Key Operating drilled a new well on the Richardson Tract that 
increased its use of the road.12 In 2007, the Hegars sued Key Operating for 
trespass and sought a permanent injunction against Key Operating’s continued 
use of the road. After a bench trial, the trial court permanently enjoined Key 
Operating from using the road for any purpose related to the production of 
minerals off the Curbo Tract.13 The court entered a finding of fact that no 
minerals were being produced from the Curbo Tract.14 
The Hegars advanced a number of theories on appeal that, if sustained, 
would have been very disruptive for the industry. The Hegars generally lost those 
points and the opinion is broadly supportive of the dominance of the mineral 
estate and the scope of the implied right to use the surface that is appurtenant to 
the mineral estate. Nevertheless, the Hegars won on a single factual sufficiency 
point, because there was no oil being produced from the Curbo Tract.15 
The Hegars contended that the Key Operating lease and the pooling 
agreement did not exist prior to the original severance of the surface estate from 
the 1/16 of the mineral estate eventually leased by Key Operating and therefore 
were not in the Hegars’ chain of title or binding on them.16 The Hegars also 
contended that the rights of mineral owners to subsequently use the surface 
estate were limited to those rights that existed at the time of the mineral 
severance.17 The court agreed that Key Operating’s lease and pooling agreement, 
which are not part of the Hegars’ chain of title and to which they did not agree, 
 
 5. Id. at 323. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 324. 
 14. Id. at 333. 
 15. Id. at 336. 
 16. Id. at 324–25. 
 17. Id. at 324. 
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cannot expand Key Operating’s right to use the Hegars’ surface.18 Under the 
common law, the owner or lessee of the dominant mineral estate has a right to 
develop the minerals, which includes “‘an implied right to use the surface estate 
in ways reasonably necessary to carry out its operations.’”19 The mineral lessee’s 
implied right to use the surface also generally extends to the surface of a pooled 
area, but a lease executed after the time the mineral and surface estates are 
severed is not part of the surface estate’s chain of title and cannot bind 
subsequent surface estate owners without their consent.20 Therefore, Key 
Operating could not rely on its lease and pooling agreement to support its right 
to use the road on the Hegars’ land.21 In summary, the Hegars acquired a 
surface estate which was not subject to an existing lease. 
However, as a mineral lessee of an interest in the Curbo Tract, “Key 
Operating has the same surface rights [the mineral owner] has always had: the 
right to use the surface of the Curbo Tract to produce oil from beneath the 
surface, regardless of whether that oil is comingled with oil from other tracts.”22 
A mineral owner’s implied surface “easement necessarily includes the rights of 
ingress and egress upon the land for the exploration and production of oil and 
gas.”23 The court held that Key Operating’s common law surface easement gave 
it the right to use the road on the Curbo Tract to produce oil from the 
Richardson–Curbo Unit so long as part of the purpose for using the road 
included obtaining production from the Curbo Tract.24 Thus, while the Hegars 
were not bound by the terms of Key Operating’s lease or pooling agreement, Key 
Operating had the right to use the road across the Hegars’ surface to explore and 
extract oil from the Curbo Tract, even if the extracted oil was comingled with oil 
from the Richardson Tract and produced using a well on the Richardson Tract 
pursuant to a pooling agreement.25 The opinion is a thorough analysis of the 
scope of the common law implied easement and the limits imposed by, and the 
relationship to, the accommodation doctrine.26 
The court expressly rejected the Hegars’ theory that the mineral owners’ 
surface rights were restricted to those that existed at the time of the mineral 
severance, which would effectively preclude pooling by anyone who did not also 
own the surface estate, and which would be contrary to Texas public policy.27 
The court held that the right to use the surface of the Curbo Tract to access the 
Richardson-Curbo Unit wells was supported by “(1) the nature of the implied 
surface easement, (2) practical and public policy considerations, and (3) 
analogous cases,” but only “so long as that production includes production from 
 
 18. Id. at 326. 
 19. Id. (quoting SWEPI LP v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 314 S.W.3d 253, 256 (Tex. App.—Austin 
2010, pet. denied)). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 325. 
 23. Id. at 326 (citing Ball v. Dillard, 602 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. 1980)). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 325. 
 26. Id. at 329–30. 
 27. Id. at 327. 
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the Curbo Tract.”28 
The trial court, after listening to competing experts, determined that no oil 
was being produced from the Curbo Tract.29 In the absence of a pooling or 
similar agreement to which the Hegars consented or to which they or their title 
are otherwise subject, Key Operating had no right to use the road across the 
Hegars’ surface for the purpose of producing oil that was being produced only 
from the Richardson Tract.30 
The dissenting opinion is based largely on the belief that the majority opinion 
turns on the accommodation doctrine.31 However, the majority opinion 
generally discusses the accommodation doctrine only in the context of being the 
remedy for the surface owner whose surface use is impaired or limited. This case 
turned on whether the implied surface easement existed when there was no 
production from the surface owner’s tract. The majority also noted that the case 
related exclusively to injunctive relief.32 The issue was not excessive use or the 
reasonableness of use, which could subject a mineral owner or lessee to liability 
for damages.33 
This case is important because it broadly supports surface uses related to 
pooling and off-lease unit production and comingling of that production, 
provided only that there is evidence of some production from the tract subjected 
to the surface use. The production fact question will be troublesome, because it 
will generally require expert testimony to obtain a finding. Prior to trial, 
uncertainty is generally leverage for the surface owner. Presumably, “production” 
in this context is not limited to actual production, but includes operations 
intended to obtain production. However, there are many Texas cases holding 
that “production” means actual production under other facts and circumstances. 
Wynne/Jackson Development, L.P. v. PAC Capital Holdings, Ltd.34 held that a 
conveyance of a non-participating royalty interest (NPRI) was effective to convey 
a fractional royalty of 1/16 of production.35 The parties aligned as successors-in-
interest to the Grantor and Grantee under three deeds with an identical issue.36 
The deeds reserved to Grantor an NPRI equal to “one-half (1/2) of the usual 
one-eighth (1/8) royalty in and to all oil, gas, and other minerals produced, 
saved and sold.”37 A subsequent lease provided for royalty payments equal to 
1/4 of production.38 The issue in the case was whether Grantor reserved 1/16 of 
production (1/2 of 1/8 = 1/16 [fractional royalty]) or 1/8 of production (1/2 of 
1/4 = 1/8 [fraction of royalty]).39 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 336. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 336–38 (Sharp, J., dissenting). 
 32. Id. at 331. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Wynne/Jackson Development, L.P. v. PAC Capital Holdings, Ltd., No. 13-12-00449-CV, 
2013 WL 2470898 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 6, 2013, pet. denied). 
 35. Id. at *1. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at *4. 
 38. Id. at *1. 
 39. Id. at *1–2. 
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The Texas Supreme Court has construed “one-half of one-eighth of the oil, 
gas and other mineral royalty” to mean a 1/16 fractional royalty.40 The language 
that the Court construed did not contain the words “the usual.”41 The San 
Antonio Court of Appeals has construed “an undivided one-fourth of the usual 
one-eighth royalty in all of the oil, gas or other minerals produced, saved and 
sold from the premises conveyed under the terms of any valid oil and gas lease” 
to mean a 1/32 fractional royalty.42 The court found these precedents to be 
persuasive and held that the deeds reserved a 1/16 fractional royalty as a matter 
of law, after relying upon the usual canons of construction: determining the 
intent of the parties, the “four corners” rule, and harmonizing all parts.43 
There continues to be some tension between various opinions construing the 
effect of the words “the usual 1/8 royalty” when used in instruments executed 
during the time when the lease royalty was almost always 1/8. The tilt seems to 
be toward holding that the words are merely descriptive of the fractional royalty 
conveyed or reserved, rather than objective evidence of an intent to create a 
fraction of royalty (floating royalty). 
Gonyea v. Kerby44 construed two conflicting contracts for deed against the 
draftsman after considering extrinsic evidence. Gonyea contracted with Kerby to 
sell and convey two lots that together comprised just over two acres in Alvarado, 
Texas. Gonyea drafted two contracts for deed, signed them, and sent them to 
Kerby. Kerby signed both, sent one back to Gonyea, and Kerby kept the other. 
The contract retained by Kerby stated that the mineral rights in the property 
would be conveyed to the purchaser when the note for the deed had been paid 
in full, while the contract returned to Gonyea stated just the opposite—that no 
mineral rights would be conveyed to the purchaser even when the note was paid 
in full. By the contract’s terms, it was a monthly installment sale over a fifteen-
year term.45 In 2005, Gonyea signed an oil and gas lease on the property.46 In 
2008, shortly before the final payment was due, Kerby noticed that there was oil 
and gas activity happening on the property and contacted Gonyea to inquire 
about the mineral rights.47 Gonyea told Kerby that Kerby did not own the 
mineral rights and that they were not for sale.48 Kerby made his final payment, 
and when Gonyea refused to convey the minerals, Kerby sued Gonyea for 
breach of contract.49 
The parties agreed that their agreement was ambiguous, and Kerby obtained a 
jury verdict on his breach-of-contract claim.50 The issue on appeal was the 
 
 40. Id. at *4 (quoting Harris v. Ritter, 279 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. 1955)). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. (quoting Pickens v. Hope, 764 S.W.2d 256, 258-59 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, writ 
denied)). 
 43. Id. at *5. 
 44. Gonyea v. Kerby, No. 10-12-00182-CV, 2013 WL 4040117 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 8, 
2013, pet. filed) (mem. op.). 
 45. Id. at *1. 
 46. Id. at *1 n.2. 
 47. Id. at *1. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at *2. 
 50. Id. 
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sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury finding that the parties had 
agreed to convey the minerals.51 
The court found that neither contract, when read alone, was ambiguous, and 
that the ambiguity only results from reading the two contracts together.52 The 
court cited the usual rules of construction that the intent of the parties is to be 
determined from the written agreement and that separate instruments executed 
at the same time, between the same parties, and relating to the same subject 
matter may be considered together and construed as one contract.53 The court 
resolved this conundrum by concluding that the jury had, in effect, picked 
which contract was the agreement between the parties, and the determination of 
which contract was the agreement was a fact question. The existence of the 
second contract that differed from the first was parol evidence indicating that 
there were issues of fact for the jury to decide. The fact that Gonyea drafted two 
contracts and Kerby kept one of the contracts was enough for the jury to find 
that the parties agreed on the contract Kerby kept.54 
Moreover, if forced to construe the two contracts together, the court held that 
it would still find for Kerby as a matter of law because Gonyea drafted both of 
the contracts for deed. Texas law provides that contracts are to be construed 
against the draftsman.55 
Because the two contracts were so clearly irreconcilable, the case highlights 
the significance of a fact finding at the trial court level regarding the 
“agreement” of the parties, and the risk of being the draftsman under the law 
applicable to the construction of the agreement of the parties. 
III.  LEASE AND LEASING ISSUES56 
Stroud Prod., L.L.C. v. Hosford57 held that a lessee could intentionally wash out 
an overriding royalty interest by allowing the burdened lease to terminate while 
acquiring an unburdened top lease.58 In 1978, the lessor granted two leases 
(Base Leases) that were subsequently drilled, produced, and burdened by a 
combined 5% overriding royalty held by Hosford, et al. (Hosford).59 In 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at *5 n.4. 
 53. Id. at *4. 
 54. Id. at *5. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Other notable cases dealing with lease and leasing issues include the following: Wade v. 
XTO Energy Inc., No. 02-12-00007-CV, 2013 WL 257361 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 24, 2013, 
no pet.) (mem. op.) (lease and statute of frauds); Bradshaw v. Steadfast Fin., L.L.C., 395 S.W.3d 
348 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. filed) (duty owed by executive to NPRI owner); Potts v. 
Chesapeak Exploration, L.L.C., No. 3:12-CV-1596-O, 2013 WL 874711 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2013) 
(mem. op.) (net-back market value at point of sale); Fain Family First Ltd. P’ship v. EOG Res. Inc., 
No. 02-12-00081-CV, 2013 WL 1668281(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 18, 2013, no pet.) (mem. 
op.) (shut-in royalty on well not connected to pipeline); Torch Energy Advisors Inc. v. Plains 
Exploration & Prod. Co., 409 S.W.3d 46 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. filed) (recovery 
of overpaid royalty); Lucas v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., No. 2:12-CV-00592-JRG, 2013 WL 
5200046 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2013) (class action on deductions of post-production costs). 
 57. Stroud Prod., L.L.C. v. Hosford, 405 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, 
pet. filed). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 798. 
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December 2003, Stroud et al. (Stroud) acquired the Base Leases and assumed 
operations.60 In January 2004, production ceased because of a minor mechanical 
problem.61 In February 2004, Stroud acquired Top Leases on different terms on 
the same property.62 In April 2004, the Base Leases terminated for failure to 
resume production within the time permitted under the ninety-day continuous 
operations clause.63 In May 2004, Stroud fixed the mechanical problem and 
promptly resumed production, but under the Top Leases.64 The assignments of 
overriding royalty to Hosford burdening the Base Leases did not contain 
renewal and extension clauses.65 Stroud refused to pay overriding royalty to 
Hosford.66 “Stroud admitted that he intentionally returned the well to 
production in June 2004, only after the [Base Leases] had terminated, [the Top 
Leases] had been obtained, and the 90-day continuous operations period had 
passed. He also admitted that he ‘did not want any overriding royalty interest on 
the new leases and [Hosford’s] overriding royalty interests had been ‘washed 
out.’”67 There was no express surrender clause in the Base Leases.68 
The issue was whether Texas recognizes a cause of action for intentional 
termination of an overriding royalty interest.69 The court surveyed in detail 
relevant Texas cases on the duty a lessee owes to an overriding royalty interest 
holder under Texas law.70 The court concluded that: 
In sum, no Texas court has yet recognized that a lessee generally owes any 
type of duty, whether it be an implied contractual covenant or a fiduciary-
type duty, to protect the interest of an overriding royalty interest holder so 
as to require the lessee to make repairs to well equipment, perpetuate the 
lease, and ensure that such overriding interests are not extinguished.71 
The court observed that the two Texas Supreme Court opinions on topic, 
Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes72 and Ridge Oil Co. v. Guinn Investments, Inc.,73 
indicate that although the question of whether any duty is owed is uncertain 
under Texas law, the language of the controlling documents, and the 
circumstances and relationships of the parties should be considered when 
making such a determination.74 
As to the circumstances and relationship of the parties, the court found no 
evidence of a formal fiduciary relationship between Stroud and Hosford, and 
 
 60. Id. at 799. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 800. 
 63. Id. at 799. 
 64. Id. at 800. 
 65. Id. at 799. 
 66. Id. at 798–800. 
 67. Id. at 799–800. 
 68. Id. at 810. 
 69. Id. at 797. 
 70. Id. at 803–09. 
 71. Id. at 809. 
 72. Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1967). 
 73. Ridge Oil Co. v. Guinn Investments, Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143 (Tex. 2004). 
 74. Stroud, 405 S.W.3d at 809. 
108 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 1 
there was no special relationship of trust and confidence spanning over a long 
period of time.75 Thus, there was no relationship duty. 
As to the language of the controlling documents, the court first observed that 
the assignments of overriding royalty did not include a renewal or extension 
clause, which some courts have suggested may provide some evidence of a 
fiduciary relationship or support a constructive trust remedy.76 However, those 
same courts then noted that when the underlying lease has an express surrender 
clause, there can be no implied duty to keep the lease in effect.77 Thus, the court 
noted that a renewal clause, if it existed, could provide some evidence of a 
fiduciary relationship, but it would not be determinative.78 The Base Leases did 
not include an express surrender clause that would permit the lessee to 
terminate the leases at will and thereby support the conclusion that there is no 
duty owed by the lessee to the overriding royalty owner. However, at least one 
Texas court has held that the absence of an express surrender clause in the lease, 
even when there is a renewals and extensions clause in the assignment of 
overriding royalty, is not enough to impose a duty.79 
Here the court did not find anything in the assignment of the overriding 
royalty interest or the Base Leases that obligated Stroud to take other action to 
perpetuate the lease, and therefore, the absence of an express surrender clause in 
the Base Leases did not indicate some sort of special duty that Stroud owed 
Hosford.80 The court concluded that while a party that engages in conduct to 
intentionally wash out an overriding royalty interest may be subject to liability, 
because here there was no evidence that Stroud violated any express or implied 
contractual duty and there was no evidence of the existence of a fiduciary or 
confidential relationship, Stroud did not commit an actionable wrong by 
intentionally terminating the Base Leases to extinguish the overriding royalty 
interest.81 There is a lengthy dissent that is generally based on the fact that there 
was no express surrender clause in the Base Leases.82 It reads the Base Leases 
into the assignment of overriding royalty interests to conclude that lease clauses, 
such as the implied covenant to reasonably develop, created duties that the 
lessee owed to the overriding royalty owner.83 
This case appears to squarely raise the issue of the duty owed by the lessee to 
the holder of an overriding royalty interest in a “wash-out” transaction. This case 
holds that there is no duty owed, in the absence of renewals and extensions 
clause, if the lessee is simply pursing its own best interests. 
Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. v. Healey, L.P.84 held that an oil and gas lease 
 
 75. Id. at 809–10. 
 76. Id. at 810. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. (citing Exploration Co. v. Vega Oil & Gas Co., 843 S.W.2d 123, 124, 126 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied)). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 811 (citing Keese v. Cont’l Pipe Line Co., 235 F.2d 386, 388 (5th Cir. 1956)). 
 82. Id. at 814–35 (Keyes, J., dissenting). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. v. Healey, L.P., No. 12-11-00236-CV, 2013 WL 1282007 (Tex. 
App.—Tyler Mar. 28, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 
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terminated for breach of covenant. Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation (Cabot) was 
the lessee and operator of three oil and gas leases and Healey, L.P. (Healey) was 
the lessor. There were multiple production units and at least twenty-one wells 
were drilled.85 The leases each contained the following provisions: 
Lessee shall, during the drilling of any wells on the leased premises, furnish 
Lessor daily drilling reports, copies of all logs runs, monthly production 
reports for the life of said well(s), copies of all reports and forms filed with 
the State regulatory bodies in connection with such wells, well locations, 
dates of completion and abandonment. Lessee shall also furnish Lessor 
copies of any title opinions or title reports which Lessee may obtain on the 
leased premises. 
* * * 
Any breach by Lessee of any term, provision[,] or covenant in this lease 
shall be grounds for cancellation of this lease (together with any other 
remedies available to Lessor).86 
Healey alleged that Cabot and Cabot’s predecessor had failed to furnish the 
information as required by the leases, suggested that the leases had terminated, 
and requested to be treated as a working interest owner in the pooled units. 
Cabot responded by attempting to provide the missing data. Healey filed suit 
asserting claims for breach of contract, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 
leases had terminated and that Healey was an unleased cotenant, and requesting 
an accounting.87 That these leases could terminate for breach of covenant was 
apparently uncontroverted, and the issues in the case were generally procedural 
and matters of proof. 
The case was tried as a declaratory judgment action rather than in trespass to 
try title.88 The court reviewed various Texas cases that were illustrative of the 
difference between the two causes of action, and concluded that, “[w]ith an 
exception not applicable here, a trespass to try title claim is the exclusive method 
in Texas for adjudicating disputed claims of title to real property.”89 Because the 
case should have been in trespass to try title, Cabot contended that the 
declaratory judgment should be reversed,90 that attorney’s fees could not be 
awarded,91 and that Healey had failed to meet the strict evidentiary burdens 
required in trespass to try title.92 The court held that Cabot failed to preserve 
error on all of those points by not submitting an exception in writing to the trial 
court prior to the submission of the charge under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 
90.93 
 
 85. Id. at *1. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at *2 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 22.001(a) (West 2000)). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at *3. 
 92. Id. at *5. 
 93. Id. at *3–5. 
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Much of the proof required to establish drilling costs on each well was 
dependent upon a business records affidavit with multiple records attached as 
provided by Cabot’s predecessor.94 Cabot’s well-by-well payout methodology was 
apparently unchallenged, but the underlying evidence was contested on the basis 
of Healey’s objections that the exhibit was hearsay, constituted an impermissible 
summary, and failed to demonstrate that the costs set forth therein were 
reasonable and necessary.95 The trial court sustained Healey’s objections and 
excluded the evidence; however, this decision was reversed on appeal.96 Of 
particular note, the court held that evidence that the costs were reasonable and 
necessary was not required to secure admissibility of the business records, but 
only as an element of proof of the defense of offset.97 
Having held that the exhibit was improperly excluded, the court next weighed 
the gravity of the harm to Cabot as a result of the exclusion. The court recited 
the rule that an error causes harm if it is dispositive of a material issue.98 Here, 
although Cabot was precluded from introducing the exhibit into evidence, it 
would still have been required to show that the expenses outlined in the exhibit 
were reasonable and necessary.99 Surprisingly, after reviewing and analyzing the 
evidence and the relationship between Cabot and its predecessor, the court held 
that Cabot did not and could not demonstrate that the costs outlined in the 
exhibit were reasonable and necessary. Thus, the exclusion of the exhibit was 
not harmful.100 
Perhaps Cabot’s best chance to preserve its leases on the merits was the 
affirmative defense of substantial performance, but the trial court refused 
Cabot’s requested issue.101 The court noted that jury instructions are reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard, and if any part of the question, 
instruction, or definition fails, then the court can deny the entire request.102 
Instructions should not have the effect of “advis[ing] the jury of the effect of its 
answers.”103 Here, the proposed instructions would have advised the jury that if 
they answered in the affirmative, Healey would not be able to terminate the 
leases.104 Cabot stretched too far for this court. Accordingly, the court held that 
the trial court did not err by refusing to submit the proposed question.105 The 
trial court’s rejection of proposed questions on waiver and quasi-estoppel was 
also affirmed on appeal.106 
Finally, the court considered whether the trial court erred by not allowing the 
recovery of costs from a dry hole that produced data that aided in the 
 
 94. Id. at *5. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at *5–8. 
 97. Id. at *8. 
 98. Id. at *9 (citing Mentis v. Barnard, 870 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. 1994)). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at *10.  
 101. Id. at *11. 
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development of the unit as a whole.107 The court avoided that issue because, 
regardless of the benefit to the land, Cabot had produced no evidence that the 
expenses associated with the dry hole were reasonable and necessary.108 
The significance of this case is that it confirms conventional wisdom that a 
lease provision making the lease determinable upon breach of covenant is simply 
unacceptable to any lessee. How to resolve cases tried as declaratory judgments 
that should have been tried in trespass to try title is now a common problem. It 
is perhaps a new approach to hold that the party who happens to lose the trial is 
stuck on appeal because neither party objected to the failure of both parties to 
use the exclusive method in Texas for adjudicating disputed claims of title to 
real property. 
PanAmerican Operating, Inc. v. Maud Smith Estate109 held that an independent 
landman’s apparent authority and the company’s failure to promptly repudiate 
an oil and gas lease made the lease binding on the company. PanAmerican 
Operating, Inc. (PanAm) hired landmen as independent contractors, including 
Robert Wormser (Wormser).110 PanAm provided Wormser with a cubicle, an 
office landline, a company email domain name, and the president of PanAm 
knew exactly what Wormser was doing on behalf of PanAm.111 Wormser 
contacted William Elder (Elder), the attorney responsible for negotiating leases 
on behalf of the Maud Smith Estate (Maud), to negotiate a lease on Maud’s 
property for PanAm.112 Wormser identified himself as a PanAm representative 
but never disclosed that he was an independent contractor.113 Wormser and 
Elder agreed on terms, and Wormser sent Elder a form lease from his PanAm 
email account.114 On June 2, 2008, Elder accepted and emailed a copy of the 
signed lease to Wormser and asked for the lease bonus.115 On July 21, 2008, 
Elder sent the original lease to PanAm.116 On August 12, 2008, PanAm 
acknowledged receipt of the lease.117 After the price of oil dropped precipitously, 
PanAm asserted that Wormser had no authority to execute leases on its 
behalf.118 Apparently, PanAm dodged the payment questions from Elder for 
about three months before repudiating the validity of the lease, and PanAm’s 
possession of the lease prevented Maud from leasing to a third party.119 Maud 
sued PanAm for breach of contract based on failure to pay the lease bonus.120 
The issues on appeal were whether Wormser held the apparent authority to 
bind PanAm and whether PanAm ratified the lease by failing to timely repudiate 
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the lease.121 
“Apparent authority arises when a principal either knowingly permits its 
agent to hold himself out as having authority or acts with such a lack of ordinary 
care as to clothe its agent with indicia of authority.”122 Silence may also 
constitute a manifestation of apparent authority.123 It was undisputed that 
Wormser had authority to obtain leases on PanAm’s behalf and to negotiate on 
PanAm’s behalf.124 The court held that a reasonably prudent person would have 
believed Wormser possessed the authority to contract on PanAm’s behalf 
because PanAm acted with “such a lack of ordinary care as to clothe Wormser 
with indicia of authority.”125 
“Ratification is the adoption or confirmation, by a party with actual 
knowledge of all material facts, of a prior act that did not then legally bind that 
party and which that party had a right to repudiate.”126 “A party ratifies a 
contract by acting under it, performing under it, or affirmatively acknowledging 
it.”127 PanAm knew all the material facts surrounding Wormser’s acquisition of 
the lease, and “by keeping the lease and failing to repudiate it when presented 
with the opportunity to do so, [PanAm] affirmatively acknowledged its validity, 
thereby ratifying it.”128 
PanAm argued there was no clear evidence PanAm intended to ratify the 
lease.129 The court dismissed this argument because Maud was only required to 
demonstrate that PanAm performed an “intentional act that was inconsistent 
with any intention to avoid the lease.”130 The “intent may be inferred from the 
acceptance of benefits under the lease after having full knowledge of the act that 
would make the lease voidable.”131 The benefit PanAm received was obtaining a 
signed lease without having to pay until PanAm determined whether honoring 
the lease made economic sense.132 Therefore, PanAm ratified the lease by failing 
to repudiate after obtaining sufficient knowledge of the facts.133 
The significance of this case is that it highlights the risk in failing to promptly 
repudiate a lease or a contract to lease. The industry frequently uses contract 
landmen, and the facts in this case were particularly bad for PanAm. But the 
issues about authority can arise in a narrower context, such as the specific 
business points (bonus, royalty, term) in a lease, other lease provisions, or the 
lease form itself. Such issues would be more common than a complete 
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repudiation of authority, but the landman’s apparent authority and the 
company’s acquiescence will be equally important on those issues. 
IV.  INDUSTRY CONTRACTS134 
Indian Oil Company, LLC v. Bishop Petroleum Inc.135 held that in the absence of 
an express or implied release, a non-operator assigning its interest under a 1989 
M.F.O.A. remains liable for operating costs and plugging and abandonment 
costs. Bishop Petroleum (Operator) was the operator under an A.A.P.L. Form 
610—1989 Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) for a well in Escambia County, 
Alabama. Operator drilled the Scott Paper 27-1 Well, which produced from 
1993 until 2007. William E. Trotter, II (Non-Operator) was a non-operating 
working interest owner under the JOA. In 2002, Non-Operator assigned his 
8.5% working interest in the well to Indian Oil Company, LLC (Assignee), 
notified Operator of the assignment, and thereafter, Operator distributed 
revenues and billed expenses to Assignee.136 
When the well stopped producing in 2007, Operator eventually proposed a 
workover under the “July AFE” in the amount of $589,800, which Assignee and 
various other working interest owners approved, but it was not approved by 
Non-Operator. Workover operations started on October 1, 2007, and were 
more difficult and lengthy than Operator anticipated. As a result, Operator 
abandoned the workover efforts in January 2008 after incurring approximately 
$1.6 million in costs. In 2009, Operator sent an AFE to the working interest 
owners in the amount of $243,300 for plugging and abandonment.137 
Neither Operator nor Assignee paid any expenses associated with the 
reworking or plugging and abandonment.138 Operator sued Non-Operator, 
Assignee, and various other working interest owners for breach of contract, 
quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment.139 Operator prevailed in the trial 
court, and only Non-Operator appealed.140 
Non-Operator contended that Operator had breached the JOA as a matter of 
law by (1) failing to provide daily workover reports141 and (2) failing to issue a 
new AFE when the workover became dramatically more complex and expensive 
than the original AFE anticipated.142 Non-Operator also contended that its 
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liability for costs incurred should be limited to costs incurred in connection with 
operations in which Non-Operator agreed to participate prior to Non-Operator’s 
assignment to Assignee.143 
Non-Operator’s argument as to daily workover reports was based on Article 
V.D.7(b) of the JOA, which stated, “Operator will send to Non-Operators such 
reports, test results, and notices regarding the progress of operations on the well 
as the Non-Operators shall reasonably request, including, but not limited to, 
daily drilling reports, completion reports, and well logs.”144 The court noted that 
this language requires the operator to provide such reports as non-operators 
“reasonably request,” and did not require the provision of “any and all 
requested reports.”145 Because Non-Operator never requested a report, 
Operator’s failure to provide reports could not be considered breach of 
contract.146 Non-Operator also alleged that Operator was under a duty to 
provide daily workover reports because such reports had been requested by one 
of the other working interest owners.147 The court noted that Non-Operator 
offered no authority for the proposition that “one working interest owner’s 
request for reports obligated [Operator] to send reports to every working interest 
owner, including those who made no such request.”148 The court held that Non-
Operator did not establish that by failing to provide workover reports, Operator 
had breached the JOA as a matter of law.149 
Non-Operator also contended that Operator should have issued a new AFE 
when the workover operations contemplated by the July AFE became 
dramatically more expensive than originally anticipated and additional 
operations were undertaken, and that Operator’s failure to do so was a breach of 
the JOA. Non-Operator contended that the evidence established Operator’s 
breach as a matter of law, but the court noted that the evidence was 
contradictory. An expert witness had testified that issuing a new AFE would 
have required dismissing the workover rig and that the fishing operations that 
were conducted were a normal part of the kinds of workover operations 
contemplated by the July AFE. Therefore, the court held that Non-Operator had 
failed to show that Operator had breached the JOA.150 
The jury found that Non-Operator was liable for $336,393.42 for expenses 
incurred under the JOA. Non-Operator argued that there was no evidence to 
support this amount because (1) Non-Operator had assigned his interest to 
Assignee in 2002, and Non-Operator was thus not liable for expenses 
subsequently incurred under the JOA, and (2) Non-Operator had not consented 
to the July AFE, and therefore, could not have incurred any expenses under 
it.151 
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The parties’ disagreement on this issue centered on different interpretations 
of the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion in Seagull Energy E & P, Inc. v. Eland 
Energy, Inc.152 The Supreme Court held that an assignor of a working interest 
subject to a joint operating agreement remained liable for operating expenses 
when the assignee failed to pay for the operating expenses attributable to that 
interest (in Eland, plugging and abandonment costs).153 Operator asserted that, 
under Eland, in the absence of an express or implied release, Non-Operator 
remained liable for all expenses incurred under the JOA, notwithstanding 
Operator’s assignment to Assignee.154 This court distinguished Eland, because 
the operating agreement construed in Eland did not address the assignor’s 
liability for expenses incurred subsequent to the assignment. It was silent as to 
continuing liabilities.155 The JOA in this case was not silent as to a party’s 
ongoing liability subsequent to an assignment.156 The pertinent language from 
the JOA provided: 
[N]o assignment or other disposition of interest by a party shall relieve such 
party of obligations previously incurred by such party hereunder with 
respect to the interest transferred, including without limitation the 
obligation of a party to pay all the costs attributable to an operation 
conducted hereunder in which such party has agreed to participate prior to 
making such assignments.157 
This language made Non-Operator liable for expenses “previously incurred,” 
i.e., incurred before Non-Operator assigned to Assignee.158 Non-Operator 
conceded that Non-Operator continued to be liable for monthly operating costs 
and the costs of plugging and abandoning the well.159 However, Non-Operator 
had assigned the working interest to Assignee in 2002, and Operator did not 
request approval for the workover until 2007.160 Under the “previously 
incurred” language, Non-Operator could not be liable for expenses incurred 
pursuant to the July AFE.161 
The amount the jury awarded included workover costs, monthly operating 
expenses, and plugging and abandonment expenses.162 Although the evidence 
was insufficient to support the entire damage amount awarded against Non-
Operator, it was sufficient to support some damages.163 The court remanded the 
case to determine liability and damages.164 
The significance of the case is that it limits the continuing obligations of non-
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operators under Eland, at least under the 1989 M.F.O.A., to those obligations 
“previously incurred.” This does not mean accrued, but incurred, so the 
assigning non-operator will continue to be liable for monthly operating costs, 
plugging and abandonment costs, and other liabilities included in the operating 
agreement. Presumably the assigning non-operator will be able to avoid only 
those subsequent liabilities that require an express subsequent consent. 
Although the issues on providing reports under an operating agreement 
generally went off on evidence points, the opinion suggests that under the 1989 
M.F.O.A., the obligation to deliver reports requires a reasonable request and not 
every operational event of a workover will trigger an obligation to issue a new 
AFE. 
Southwestern Energy Production Co. v. Berry-Helfand165 held that the use for 
personal gain of a prospect analysis disclosed under a confidentiality agreement 
was a misappropriation of a trade secret. Over the course of several years, 
Helfand (a reservoir engineer) and her geologist partners conducted a detailed 
analysis of public and semi-public production data for 600 wells in a six county 
area.166 They identified ten sweet spots favorable for production from the James 
Lime formation with several stacked pays.167 Helfand focused on two of the 
prospects where leases were available and began leasing with the object of selling 
her prospects for cash and an overriding royalty interest.168 In February 2005, 
Southwestern Energy Production Company (Sepco) signed a confidentiality 
agreement with Helfand regarding the materials to be presented by Helfand, and 
Exhibit A, describing the area subject to the noncompetition agreement, was 
limited to those two prospects.169 Helfand then presented to Sepco the results of 
her research and analysis identifying all ten of the sweet spots.170 Prior to the 
presentation, Sepco had no interest in the James Lime because of poor 
production history.171 After the presentation, Sepco declined to participate in 
Helfand’s prospects, because the prospects failed Sepco’s economic criteria.172 
Helfand promptly sold the same two prospects to Petrohawk.173 Soon after the 
Helfand/Sepco meeting, Sepco began leasing land in the area of Helfand’s sweet 
spots, ultimately acquiring 1,800 leases on or near the sweet spots.174 Two years 
after the presentation, Sepco drilled a successful James Lime well and then 
began a large scale drilling program in the James Lime.175 Ultimately, Sepco 
drilled or participated in over eighty James Lime wells, all successful and all 
clustered in and around Helfand’s sweet spots.176 Helfand filed suit against 
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Sepco in February 2009.177 The jury found against Sepco on five liability 
theories, including common law trade secret misappropriation.178 The trial court 
awarded approximately $11 million in actual damages to Helfand.179 
“A trade secret is ‘any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information 
which is used in one’s business and presents an opportunity to obtain an 
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.’”180 The court quickly 
concluded that Helfand’s “massive compilation and analysis” of data drawn 
from public and semi-public sources was a trade secret, because it led her to 
identify sweet spots and stacked pays.181 Further, the court determined that 
Helfand’s trade secret was not lost when she shared the material with other 
operators because these disclosures were conditioned on the execution of 
confidentiality agreements.182 
A plaintiff seeking to prevail on a trade secret misappropriation in Texas must 
prove “(1) the existence of a trade secret, (2) a breach of a confidential 
relationship or improper discovery of the trade secret, (3) use of the trade secret, 
and (4) damages.”183 “Trade secret misappropriation may be proven by 
circumstantial evidence.”184 “A person must bring suit for misappropriation of a 
trade secret no later than three years after the misappropriation is discovered or 
by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered.”185 
Sepco maintained that, even if Helfand’s analysis was a trade secret, there was 
insufficient evidence to show that Sepco misappropriated the trade secret by 
unauthorized use.186 Essentially, Sepco claimed that the circumstantial evidence 
supporting Helfand’s misappropriation claim amounted to an unsupported 
“before and after argument,” i.e., Sepco had no James Lime wells before meeting 
with Helfand and three years later it had more than eighty wells.187 Sepco also 
offered other plausible explanations for its James Lime development, claiming 
that the well locations chosen were the product of its own in-house study.188 
The court disagreed. Although Sepco had no interest in the James Lime prior 
to the meeting, in the year that followed, it took approximately 1,800 leases that 
included James Lime drilling rights, almost all of which were in Helfand’s sweet 
spots.189 Thereafter, Sepco drilled more than eighty successful James Lime wells, 
all of which were in or near Helfand’s sweet spots.190 The timing of Sepco’s 
drilling of the James Lime wells coincided with the time required to implement 
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a drilling program to exploit Helfrand’s secrets.191 Further, Sepco failed to 
produce sufficient independent research to explain its selection of drill sites.192 
According to the court, the circumstantial evidence supporting Helfand’s claim 
was both legally and factually sufficient to support a finding that Sepco 
misappropriated and used Helfand’s trade secrets during the term of the 
confidentiality agreement.193 
Sepco also argued that Helfand’s claim of misappropriation was barred by the 
statute of limitations.194 Sepco maintained that Helfand knew or should have 
known of her wrongful injury before February 17, 2006, three years before she 
sued Sepco.195 In particular, Sepco cited emails Helfand sent in May 2005 that 
expressed her frustration with Sepco’s failure to return all the materials provided 
at the February 2005 presentation, as well as concern about the possible misuse 
of her trade secret.196 Sepco returned her materials shortly thereafter with 
assurances it retained nothing. Helfand was entitled to rely on these assurances 
and “had no objective reasonable basis for further inquiry into Sepco’s 
conduct.”197 Even if she had made further inquiries before October 2007, when 
Sepco drilled its first James Lime well, her investigation would have revealed 
nothing, because the pattern of James Lime wells would not be apparent for 
many months thereafter.198 Helfand testified that she first learned of Sepco’s 
misappropriation in January 2009.199 Accordingly, the court held that there was 
no evidence that Helfand knew or should have known that Sepco had 
misappropriated her trade secret before February 16, 2006.200 
Several other interesting issues were raised in the case. The court held that 
confidentiality agreements do not necessarily create fiduciary relationships, and 
this confidentiality agreement did not create a fiduciary relationship.201 There 
can be no theft of a trade secret when the secret is voluntarily delivered.202 There 
is an extensive analysis of the appropriate measure of damages, methodology of 
calculating damages, and proof of damages.203 
This case is significant because of the holding that a prospect analysis can be a 
trade secret and that misappropriation may result in substantial liability. 
Confidentiality agreements are commonly used in the industry; the specific 
terms and conditions of this confidentiality agreement are commonly included, 
and the attendant risks and protections are highlighted by this case. Sepco 
protected itself against the noncompetition provision by limiting the scope of 
the lands described in Exhibit A, but lost this case because it (1) used the trade 
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secret, and (2) the use was during the term of the agreement. 
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc.204 held that course 
of performance by the parties was part of a contract for the purchase and sale of 
oil under the U.C.C. and should be considered regardless of whether the 
contract was ambiguous. Anadarko sold oil to Williams under two purchase 
agreements in 2000 and 2002.205 Both of these agreements contained a 
provision that tied the contract price for crude oil to other factors, including a 
third-party accounting arrangement for quality adjustments by the TAPS Quality 
Bank for oil shipped through the pipeline.206 The contract price between 
Anadarko and Williams would be adjusted on a monthly basis according to the 
anticipated adjustment by Quality Bank, but the actual adjustment would not be 
known until Williams actually received debits or credits from Quality Bank the 
following month.207 The parties would then “true-up” the price, or bring it to 
the correct balance, in the following month’s invoice based on the actual Quality 
Bank credits or debits as received by Williams.208 Several years after the contracts 
terminated, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) revised the 
methodology used to assess the quality of oil entering a pipeline and 
retroactively applied the change, effective as of February 1, 2000.209 The change 
in methodology resulted in over a $9 million credit paid to Williams attributable 
to Anadarko’s oil.210 In August 2007, Williams received the credit and refused 
to pay Anadarko.211 
The court held that under the U.C.C., “a contract for the sale of oil is a 
contract for the sale of goods.”212 Williams contended that, under the U.C.C., 
the court could not consider evidence of course of performance without first 
finding that the contracts were ambiguous.213 The court disagreed and held that 
“‘[u]nless carefully negated,’” the course of performance becomes “‘an element 
of the meaning of the words used,’” and that “‘the course of actual performance 
by the parties is considered the best indication of what they intended the writing 
to mean.’”214 
The contract payment provision required that the payments from Williams to 
Anadarko must be timely, but there was no time limitation on Williams’s 
obligation to correct any errors in an adjustment found later.215 In fact, under 
the parties’ course of performance, adjustments were constantly made to the 
amount of payment due after the contract payment date had passed to “true up” 
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the amount due after the receipt of the adjustments from Quality Bank.216 The 
court held that, although the FERC’s methodology changes did not occur 
during the contract period, the parties had a history of not treating the payment 
provision’s monthly schedule as conclusive on the obligation to pay a final, 
correct purchase price.217 
The court also held that Williams’ obligation to pay the correct contract price 
survived the termination of the contracts.218 Upon termination of a contract, all 
executory obligations are discharged, but “‘any right based on prior breach or 
performance survives.’”219 An obligation is executory if both parties have an 
obligation yet to be performed.220 The court held that Williams’ obligation to 
“remit Quality Bank credits . . . is tied to Anadarko’s prior tender of the crude 
oil.”221 Therefore, the court concluded that “where Anadarko has already 
discharged its full performance under the contract by tendering the oil, Williams 
Alaska’s obligation to pay the correct contract price, including the Quality Bank 
credits, is no longer executory and thus survives the contract’s termination.”222 
Williams also contended that Anadarko’s claim was barred by the four-year 
statute of limitations. The court disagreed and held that the contracts were 
breached at the time Williams received the adjustments and failed to remit them 
to Anadarko, which was in August 2007. Anadarko filed suit in March 2011, 
which was within the limitations period.223 
The significance of this case is that in contracts governed by the U.C.C. (here, 
the sale of oil), course of performance is made part of the contract, is admissible 
without a prior finding of ambiguity, and is considered the best indication of 
what the parties intended by their agreement. This can only be avoided if 
carefully negated in the written agreement. Only executory obligations are 
discharged by contract termination. 
V.  LITIGATION ISSUES224 
Richmond v. Wells225 held that the rights to ownership of the non-possessory 
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interests of a lessor under an oil and gas lease (royalty and the possibility of 
reverter) should be determined in a declaratory judgment action rather than in 
trespass to try title. Simplified, Richmond owned the minerals in a tract that 
Richmond leased to Endeavor under a typical oil and gas lease. Endeavor 
completed and placed the Richmond No. 43 into production on the leased 
tract.226 Richmond contracted with Zugg to sell the tract to Zugg, but Richmond 
would keep his mineral rights.227 The Richmond-to-Zugg warranty deed was 
made subject to oil and gas leases of record and excepted “all oil, gas and other 
minerals in, on or under said land reserved by prior grantors.”228 Zugg sold to 
Wells, and the Zugg-to-Wells warranty deed contained the same language.229 
Endeavor suspended royalty payments to Richmond when Wells notified 
Endeavor that royalty payments should be made to Wells.230 Richmond and 
Wells filed competing motions for summary judgment.231 
Wells’ motion was for declaratory relief under Chapter 37 of the Texas Civil 
Practice and Remedies code.232 The trial court granted the motion, holding that 
both deeds conveyed the mineral estate, that Richmond reserved no interest in 
the mineral estate, that Richmond was not entitled to any proceeds from the 
mineral estate, and that Richmond was not entitled to a reformation of the 
Richmond-to-Zugg deed.233 
Richmond contended that Wells should have brought his claim in trespass to 
try title under Chapter 22 of the Texas Property Code and that Wells failed to 
meet his burden under that cause of action.234 Richmond relied on Martin v. 
Amerman235 in which the Texas Supreme Court held generally that trespass to try 
title is the method for determining title to real property.236 The court 
distinguished Martin because the facts in that case involved a possessory 
interest.237 Under the lease to Endeavor, the lessor retained only a royalty 
interest and a possibility of reverter, which are non-possessory interests.238 
Claims to a royalty interest and the possibility of reverter are not properly the 
subject of a trespass-to-try title cause of action.239 Even though the construction 
of the two deeds could ultimately impact title and possessory rights to the 
interests involved, the court held that the legislature did not intend for the 
trespass-to-try title statute to displace the declaratory judgment statute in this 
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case.240 The declaratory judgment statute expressly provides that any person 
interested under a deed may have determined any question of construction 
arising under the deed and obtain a declaration of rights.241 
Richmond’s motion for summary judgment for reformation of the 
Richmond-to-Zugg deed presumably would have been granted as to Zugg, but 
the issue in the case was whether Wells was a bona fide purchaser for value 
without notice of Richmond’s claim. Reformation is a claim for equitable relief 
that will not be granted if there is a bona fide purchaser. The issue was notice.242 
Richmond argued that Wells had constructive notice based on the pump jack 
and batteries on the tract. The court held that this would be notice of 
Endeavor’s rights of possession and Endeavor’s fee simple determinable 
ownership interest. “At the time of the Zugg-to-Wells deed, the interests claimed 
by [Richmond] were non-possessory ones, and Endeavor’s possession did not put 
[Wells] on notice of any interest claimed by [Richmond].”243 However, there was 
some evidence that Wells had actual knowledge of Richmond’s interest, there 
were genuine issues of material fact on whether Wells had actual knowledge, 
and the burden of proof was on Richmond.244 The court reversed the trial 
court’s judgment granting Wells’s motion for summary judgment and remanded 
for trial.245 
The opinion appears to hold that the non-possessory interests of a lessor 
under an oil and gas lease cannot be determined in trespass to try title and must 
be resolved in a declaratory judgment action. This is probably too broad, but the 
petition was denied in this case. It is also interesting that the oil and gas 
operations on the property were apparently held to be insufficient to give 
constructive notice of the rights of any party, except as to the interests of the 
lessee conducting the operations. 
VI.  REGULATION ISSUES246 
In re Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd.247 held that the trial court must make a 
preliminary finding as to a developer’s status as a common carrier before issuing 
a writ of possession pending final resolution of the landowner’s challenge to the 
developer’s common carrier status. Unsuccessful at negotiating the purchase of 
an easement necessary for its crude petroleum pipeline, TransCanada Keystone 
Pipeline, L.P. (TransCanada) filed a petition for condemnation of land owned 
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by Texas Rice Land Partners, L.P., James Holland, and David Holland 
(collectively, TRL). The trial court appointed special commissioners to hear the 
matter, who then granted TransCanada the easement and awarded TRL 
$20,808 in compensation for the easement. TRL objected to the commissioners’ 
decision and requested a jury trial on TransCanada’s common carrier status 
under the Texas Natural Resource Code.248 
TransCanada filed a motion for a writ of possession pending resolution of the 
jury trial and deposited the full award of $20,808 in the court registry, along 
with a surety bond and cost bond.249 The court issued the writ of possession to 
TransCanada, and TRL filed a petition for writ of mandamus, claiming the trial 
court abused its discretion in granting TransCanada’s writ of possession prior to 
resolving its challenge to TransCanada’s common carrier status.250 
Relying on Texas Rice Land Partners, Limited v. Denbury Green Pipeline—Texas, 
LLC,251 TRL argued that the trial court was required to fully resolve 
TransCanada’s common carrier status before TransCanada could take 
possession of TRL’s private property in conjunction with its suit for 
condemnation.252 In Denbury Green, the Texas Supreme Court explained that 
once a landowner challenges an entity’s prima facie evidence of common carrier 
status pursuant to a permit granted by the Texas Railroad Commission, “the 
burden falls upon the pipeline company to establish its common-carrier bona 
fides if it wishes to exercise the power of eminent domain. . . . Merely holding 
oneself out [as a common carrier] is insufficient under Texas law to thwart 
judicial review.”253 
However, the court noted that the Supreme Court, in Denbury Green, 
expressly limited its opinion to determining common carrier status under 
Section 111.002(6) of the Texas Resource Code.254 The Supreme Court did not 
address Section 21.021 of the Texas Property Code, the statute at issue in this 
case. 
Section 21.021 allows a party with eminent domain authority to take 
possession of the condemned property, “pending the results of further 
litigation” if that party pays the property owner the amount of damages 
and costs awarded by the special commissioners or deposits the amount of 
the award into the registry of the court.255 
“Nevertheless, we recognize that there must be evidence in the record that 
reasonably supports TransCanada’s assertion that it is an entity with ‘eminent 
domain authority,’ and it was error for the trial court to refrain from making 
such a preliminary finding.”256 However, the court held that the trial court’s 
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failure to make such a finding was harmless, given uncontroverted evidence in 
an affidavit submitted by TransCanada that its pipeline would be operated as a 
common carrier pipeline and that “‘[a]ny shipper wishing to transport crude 
petroleum meeting the specifications set forth in the [applicable] tariff . . . will 
have access to ship its crude petroleum on the pipeline for a fee[.]”257 
The significance of this case is the court’s holding that the trial court erred by 
failing to make a preliminary finding of TransCanada’s common carrier status 
before issuing a writ of possession. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The title and conveyancing cases this year brought further definition to the 
precedents involving recurring issues, such as the conveyance of fractional 
royalties, property rights conveyed or reserved by implication when the 
instrument is silent, and common rules of construction. These should be helpful 
to title examiners and to draftsmen who never want to hear from title 
examiners. However, the most interesting case and the one with the potential to 
have the most significance is Key Operating258 dealing with the implied surface 
easement held by the owner of the mineral estate. This easement affects basic 
property rights and is very important to development operations. The petition 
has been granted in this case, and the Texas Supreme Court has recently written 
extensively on the accommodation doctrine. There is a close relationship 
between that doctrine and the scope of the implied surface easement. Texas 
public policy has long favored mineral development, but increasing urbanization 
has brought increasing pressure on that public policy. 
The sharp increase in leasing, the dramatic increase in the value of mineral 
rights, and the volatility in that value have produced many cases involving lease 
and leasing issues. Most are focused on the usual issues of royalty calculations, 
post-production costs, and lease perpetuation. However, a few cases really stand 
out. There is now clear precedent for the unacceptable level of risk that is 
inherent in accepting a lease provision that terminates a lease for breach of 
covenant. No lessee should accept such a provision. The wide spread use of 
contract landmen and the rush to acquire acreage has resulted in more than a 
little confusion in lease terms, authority to lease, and conditions to leasing. A 
landman clothed with apparent authority coupled with delay in promptly 
repudiating unacceptable terms or leases may result in a lease that the company 
never signed and never wanted, but nevertheless a lease that must be purchased. 
The overriding royalty owner has never had much protection under the law, and 
it now appears that in the absence of a contractual duty or a relationship duty 
on the lessee, the lessee is free to pursue a lessee’s own interests in washing out 
the overriding royalty interest in any lease renegotiation. 
The risk of assigning to a weak assignee is inescapable under many operating 
agreements. It is not an industry practice to obtain releases from the other 
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working interest parties when an assignment is made, and not at all clear how 
such a release could actually be obtained. This is a material and unresolved 
problem under the model form operating agreements. Geologists and the 
purveyors of prospects in general should rejoice at the increase in protection 
found in recent cases for their work product. The work is valuable, and if 
confidentiality is maintained, it will be protected. The confidentiality 
agreements, nondisclosure agreements, and noncompetition agreements that the 
industry routinely employs, all have teeth. The trend will be to resist those 
agreements and to restrict their scope when it becomes a necessary risk to get a 
peek at the data. Although it is well established that the U.C.C. governs 
contracts for the purchase and sale of severed minerals, few appreciate that the 
course of performance can be more important in defining the rights of the 
parties than the written agreement. 
A very significant trend in recent years has been to renew the primacy of the 
proceeding in trespass to try title as the proper action to resolve title issues. 
Because litigators have for decades defaulted to the declaratory judgment action 
to resolve matters in controversy, lawyers and judges are still trying cases without 
following the procedure mandated for trespass to try title. The opinions on 
appeal stretch to save the ones they can, but the litigators should by now have 
the message. 
There seems to be some kind of organized guerilla warfare going on against 
pipelines. The pipelines have for years generally just rolled out their projects, but 
now there is widespread opposition and procedural and substantive challenges 
at every turn. The most common thread is an attack on common carrier status. 
While it seems unlikely that the ultimate power of the pipelines will be 
materially reduced, the exercise of that power is being strictly examined and 
construed. 
There was not much from the Texas Supreme Court this year, but it seems 
like none of the parties are now willing to stop before filing a petition for review. 
The Supreme Court will hear only a few cases, but next year could be 
interesting. 
